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SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON
JUL 7 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding "Operation Tailwind"
The attached report reflects the review conducted by the Air Force in response to your June 9, 1998 directive.
I am confident that the report accurately supports the conclusion that no nerve gas was used by the Air Force during this Operation.
[Signature]F. WHITTEN PETERS
Acting Secretary of the Air Force
Attachment:
Report
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AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT
ON
OPERATION TAILWIND
Air Force History Support Office
16 July 1998
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page/Appendix
I. Introduction
A. Events Which Prompted DoD Review ...............Page 1
B. SECDEF Directed Review .........................Page 1
C. Conclusions ....................................Page 2
II. Conduct of the Review .............................Page 2
III. Discussion
A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND ...............Page 6
B. Related Topics
1. Considerations: Nerve Agent Weapons .........Page 21
2. Clay/Killpack Letter ........................Page 22
3. Explanation of Research in SEADAB
and CACTA .................................Page 24
[Note: Appendices not in report]
IV. Appendices
A. Illustration of A-1 Skyraider with
CBU-30 Munitions Load ........................Appendix A
B. Messages from the Airborne Command
and Control Center ...........................Appendix B
C. Authorizations to Use CS "Riot Control"
Tear Gas .....................................Appendix C
D. Public Information About Nerve Agent Munition:
New York Times Articles, 1969-1971............Appendix D
E. Clay/Killpack Letter and Related
Correspondence ...............................Appendix E
F. List of Persons Interviewed and Interview Text Appendix F
G. Information on the Southeast Asian Data Base
(SEADAB)......................................Appendix G
H. Secretary Cohen's Directive ....................Appendix H
I. Combat Air Activities (CACTA) Print-out.........Appendix I
J. JRCC Search and Rescue Log .....................Appendix J
K. 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron Messages.....Appendix K
L. 1st Marine Air Wing Messages ...................Appendix L
M. Tear Gas Rockets ...............................Appendix M
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AIR FORCE HISTORY REPORT
OPERATION TAILWIND
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Events Which Prompted DoD Review
At 10:00 p.m. EDT on Sunday, 7 June 1998, Cable News Network
(CNN) telecast the first edition of a new show, "NewsStand: CNN &
Time," in coordination with Time magazine. The lead story on the 7
June telecast, called "Valley of Death," alleged that a U.S. Special
Forces unit was inserted into Laos in September 1970 to kill U.S.
military defectors. The story claimed that during the operation, code
named TAILWIND, the Special Forces unit assaulted an enemy base camp
"village" and killed enemy troops, women, children, and U.S.
defectors. The telecast alleged that Air Force A-1 Skyraider
aircraft dropped Sarin nerve gas CBU-15 munitions on the enemy base
camp prior to the attack by the Special Forces unit. The CNN telecast
also claimed that during their extraction, the Special Forces
personnel called in Air Force A-1s, which again dropped Sarin nerve
gas weapons on enemy soldiers.
The next day, Time magazine, dated 15 June 1998, included a
similar story on Operation TAILWIND, written by CNN staff.
B. Review SECDEF Directed
On Monday, 8 June, the Secretary of Defense, William S. Cohen,
announced a formal investigation of these charges. A 9 June
memorandum to the Military Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) directed a 30-day investigation of the two charges that the
TAILWIND operation was directed against U.S. military defectors and
that Sarin nerve gas was used. (See Appendix H)
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C. Conclusions
This Air Force report will only address the allegation that Air
Force A-1s dropped Sarin nerve gas during Operation TAILWIND, 11-14
September 1970. The other allegation, that Operation TAILWIND was
directed against U.S. military defectors, will be addressed by the
U.S. Army and the JCS.
Based on all of the information historians gathered in their
investigation, Sarin nerve gas was not used by Air Force aircraft
during Operation TAILWIND. The historians could find no evidence that
the CBU-15 nerve agent munition was an operational weapon or deployed
to Southeast Asia at the time.
On 13 and 14 September 1970, A-1s from the 56th Special
Operations Wing dropped CBU-30 CS tear gas munitions to assist in the
extraction of the Special Forces unit The 13 September attempt was
aborted, and the 14 September attempt succeeded.
Authorization to use CS tear gas in Search and Rescue operations
in Laos derives from a 20 January 1968 Secretary of Defense
Memorandum. (See Appendix C)
II. CONDUCT OF REVIEW
On 3 June 1997, the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO), Dr. Richard
P. Hallion, was informed of the upcoming 7 June CNN story about nerve
gas in Laos, 1970. On 4 June, Air Force personnel began a thorough
search to identify materials on TAILWIND and the use of gas of any
kind in Southeast Asia. Dr. Hallion spoke to several knowledgeable
sources: (1) Colonel Rod Paschall (retired Green Beret); (2) General
Michael Dugan (retired Air Force Chief of Staff, A-1 pilot); (3)
Colonel Eugene Deatrick (retired A-l pilot); (4) Terry Bolstad
(retired A-1 Search and Rescue (SAR) pilot); (5) Lt Col William
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Flanagan (retired F-4 weapon systems operator); and Herbert Mason
(historian for the Air Force Special Operations Command)
After the telecast, the Secretary of Defense ordered an
investigation of the allegations that TAILWIND was directed against US
military defectors, and that Sarin nerve gas was used in the
operation. The Air Force Historian then ordered a program-wide search
for relevant materials concentrating on the Air Force History Support
Office (AFHSO), the Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA), and
the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC).
Additional Interviews:
1. Wayne Thompson (AFHSO) conducted interviews with Tom Stump,
Don Feld, and Art Bishop, all of whom had been in the 56th Special
Operations Wing (SOW) as A-1 pilots. Feld and Bishop flew the CBU-30
tear gas sorties on 14 September 1970. Thompson also interviewed
Covey Forward Air Controllers of the 20th Tactical Air Support
Squadron: Gary Green, George Boehmer, and Warner McGraw.
2. Diane Putney (AFHSO) interviewed Donald Knight and Wilfred
Turcotte, officers who had commanded the 56 SOW's 456th Munitions
Maintenance Squadron (MMS) in September 1970.
3. Yvonne Kinkaid (AFHSO) interviewed Lloyd O'Daniels, Covey FAC
"Rider"; Lt Col Paul Spencer, Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456
MMS; Lt Col Wilfred Turcotte, commander, 456 MMS; Col Donald Knight,
commander, 456 MMS; SMSgt James McCoy, Munitions Services
Superintendent, 456 MMS; and CMSgt Donald Guy, Munitions Services
Superintendent, 456 MMS.
4. Sheldon Goldberg (AFHSO) also interviewed Lt Col Spencer,
Assistant Maintenance Supervisor, 456 MMS.
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Major Publications Examined:
FM 3-10/AFM 355-4, Employment of Chemical and Biological Agents,
31 March 1966.
Conboy, Kenneth and James Morrison, Shadow War: The CIA's Secret
War in Laos, Boulder, CO: Paladin Press, 1995.
Cosmas, Graham & Lt Col T. P. Murray, U.S. Marines in Vietnam:
Vietnamization and Redeployment: 1970-1971, Washington, DC, USMC,
1986.
Hammond, William M., Public Affairs: The Military and the Media,
1962-1968, Washington, DC, Center of Military History, 1988.
Plaster, John L., SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
Vietnam, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1997.
Van Buskirk, Robert and Fred Baver, Tailwind, Waco, TX, Word
Books, 1983.
The New York Times, 1969-1971.
Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, l Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
vol. 2, Hardware: Munitions, 2 November 1970, AFHSO.
Burch, Maj R. M., Project Contemporary Historical Evaluation of
Combat Operations (CHECO) SEA Report, "The ABCCC in SEA," 7 AF/DOAC,
15 January 1969.
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, "Command History 1970,
Annex B, Studies and Observations Group," 8 April 1971.
USAF Management Summary, Reference Data, Non-Nuclear Ordnance
Characteristics, HQ USAF, 1967-1970.
Guide to Air Force Armament Laboratory Non-Nuclear Munitions and
Equipment, Part 1 & 2, AFATL, 1 September 1968.
Hay, Lt Gen J. H., Jr., Vietnam Studies: Tactical and Material
Innovations, Washington, DC, DePt of Army, 1974.
Schlight, Lt Col John, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
Phanop, 5-7 December 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970.
JCS Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB), 1970-1972, in Center for
Electronic Records, NARA.
JCS Combat Air Activities (CACTA) File, 11-14 September 1970, in
Center for Electronic Records, NARA.
Seventh Air Force CHECO Microfilm, 1966-1970.
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USAF Field Histories Consulted:
Pacific Air Force, 1970
Seventh Air Force, 1968-1971
Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA), 1964-1968
OOAMA Southeast Asia Support, 1964-1968
Air Force Armament Laboratory, 1964-1971
Air Proving Ground Center, 1964-1971
USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center, 1964-1971
8th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
12th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1970
35th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
56th Special Operations Wing, 1969-1971
366th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-December 1960
388th Tactical Fighter Wing, July-September 1970
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (Theater), 1964-1971
432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, July-September 1970
504th Tactical Air Support Group, July-September 1970
41st Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, July-September 1970
3rd Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Group, July-September 1970
Participants in Air Force History Research:
Richard Hallion, The Air Force Historian
Wayne Thompson, Air Force History Support Office
Diane Putney, Air Force History Support Office
Sheldon Goldberg, Air Force History Support Office
Yvonne Kinkaid, Air Force History Support Office
Capt Roy Stanley, Air Force History Support Office
James Howard, Air Force Historical Research Agency
TSgt David Byrd, Air Force Historical Research Agency
Herbert Carlin, Air Force Materiel Command
William Elliot, Air Force Materiel Command
Vickie Johes, Air Force Materiel Command
Dennis Casey, Air Intelligence Agency
Lt Col Dale Wise, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
Team
SMSgt Jean Hardin, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification
Team
MSgt Ray Bailey, Secretary of the Air Force Declassification Team
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Richard Boylan, National Archives II-Textual Records
Charles Shaughnessy, National Archives II-Textual Records
Margret Adams, National Archives II-Center For Electronic Records
Lee Gladwin, National Archives II-Center for Electronic Records
Fred Graboske, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums
William Siebert, National Personnel Records Center
III. DISCUSSION
A. Unclassified Account of TAILWIND
On 11 September 1970, Marine CH-53 helicopters and AH-1G Cobra
gunships carried into Laos, near Chavane, a team of 16 Americans and a
Special Commando Unit (SCU), consisting of Montagnard troops. The
Americans were in Company B, Command and Control Central, Military
Advisory Command Studies and Observation Group (MACSOG). Their
mission, Operation TAILWIND, would last until 14 September 1970, and
their objectives were reconnaissance, intelligence collection, and a
diversion for a larger operation to the north.
From landing zone preparation on 11 September to extraction on 14
September, the team was provided continuous tactical air support by
Air Force, Army, and Marine assets. The enemy almost continuously
attacked the team during the four days they were in Laos. Air Force
units under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force flew 76
sorties for TAILWIND and provided Forward Air Control (FAC) and
Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) aircraft and crews
Pilots used the code words "Prairie Fire" to refer to the infiltration
and exfiltration of the MACSOG team. Similarly, MACSOG used the
"Prairie Fire" code words to identify cross-border operations into its
Laotian area of operations.
The A-1 Skyraider aircraft which flew TAILWIND missions belonged
to the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW), stationed at Nakhon Phanom
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(NKP) Air Base, Thailand. The Thirteenth Air Force provided the wing
with command, administration, facilities, and personnel, and the
Seventh Air Force exercised operational control over the wing~s
aircraft. Three units flew the A-1s assigned to the 56 SOW:
1st Special Operations Squadron at NKP
602nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP
Operating Location AA (OL-AA) at Da Nang Air Base,
South Vietnam
In September 1970, the wing's 21st Special Operations Squadron (SOS)
flew eleven CH-3E helicopters and one, new CH-53 helicopter which
arrived at NKP on 8 August. The squadron referred to the large CH-53
as "BUFF," for "big, ugly, fat fellow," and this designation should
not be confused with a similar BUFF nickname given to B-52 bombers.
The helicopters of the 21 SOS did not participate in TAILWIND because
they flew other combat missions in a "big operation," according to the
squadron history, to cut the Ho Chi Minh trail in the Bolovens area of
Laos.
The A-1 pilots assigned to the 56 SOW flew four types of combat
missions: escort, strike, armed reconnaissance, and search and rescue
(SAR). During SAR missions to rescue downed pilots, the wing operated
with the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service, which flew the HH-3
"Jolly Green Giant" helicopters. The aircraft carried weapons
appropriate for the type of mission flown. For a "strike" operation,
for example, the munitions maintenance crews would load high explosive
and fragmentation bombs and napalm. In "SAR support," at least one A-
1 aircraft on the mission would carry M-47 smoke bombs and weapons
with "CS" "riot control" tear gas, for use if warranted. An Air Force
history, written by Earl H. Tilford, Jr., and first published in 1980,
explained that tear gas was employed on SAR missions:
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As the war continued, the North Vietnamese, Viet Cong,
and Pathet Lao used increasingly sophisticated weapons and
tactics to frustrate rescue efforts. Rescue forces reacted
to these challenges by developing new weapons and changing
tactics Tear gas bombs and riot control chemicals were
some of the most controversial weapons used to support
rescue operations. These weapons included Cluster Bomb Unit
(CBU)-19A/B and CBU-30A antipersonnel area denial bombs,
which were essentially tear gas bombs.
The 56 SOW history for April-June 1969 identified the situations
when the use of tear gas would be appropriate during SAR operations.
The downed pilot himself would be deliberately gassed in some cases:
CBU-19 could be used on enemy gun or troop
concentrations when the enemy was not equipped with masks or
other protective equipment. In these areas it was more
efficient to disable the enemy temporarily than to employ
normal weapons. It was most effective in areas of
widespread small arms which were normally difficult to
locate and silence.
CBU-19 could be used directly on the survivor if the
survivor was surrounded, had been captured, or was injured
and unable to help himself and was in [imminent danger from
advancing enemy forces.
The report, "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast
Asia, 1 Jan 65-31 Dec 69," provided the five primary situations when
CBU-19 and CBU-30 were employed in South Vietnam:
To deny the enemy his use of base camps, bunkers, tunnels, and
caves
In prestrike operations in support of defoliation missions
In SAR operations to prevent the capture of downed aircrews
In offensive combat operations, such as assaults and suppression
of small arms fire around helicopter landing zones
In defensive combat operations such as perimeter defense
The 56 SOW history for July-September 1970 referred to "gas birds" and
defined them as aircraft carrying CBU-19/CBU-30. Thus, the A-1s of
the 56 SOW sometimes carried and delivered CS tear gas munitions.
The word "incapacitating" was used to describe the CS weapons.
The 56 SOW history in July described a SAR mission and mentioned
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"incapacitating ordnance." Another report, "USAF Search & Rescue in
Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70," provided a definition for "CS" in
its glossary: "personnel incapacitating agent."
The CBU-19 gas bomb had been originally designed for helicopters,
but within the Air Force, mostly A-1s expended them, and they were
little used after 1969. During 1970-1972 the Air Force principally
used the CBU-30 tear gas cluster bomb. Both propeller aircraft, A-1s,
and jet aircraft, especially F-4s and F-100s, employed the CBU-30,
which contained 66 pounds of CS tear gas, while the CBU-19 contained
only 14 pounds. The "In-Country and Out-Country Strike Operations"
report described the CBU gas munitions:
The CBU-19 chemical cluster was a 130-lb. modified
U.S. Army dispenser intended for use on helicopters and
consisted of two subclusters fitted to a strongback. Each
cluster contained 528 agent-filled canisters; each canister
contained an incapacitating chemical, called CS, and a
pyrotechnic fuze. Upon ejection from the aircraft, the fuze
ignited the CS, disseminating the CS for four to six
seconds. This required delivery below 600 feet AGL [above
ground level] to insure that the chemical reached the
ground. Also, as the cluster had originally been designed
for use on helicopters, delivery was restricted to use on
the A-1 and A-37 because the cluster could not withstand the
airloads encountered on faster aircraft. The CBU-30
consisted of the S W -13 downward ejection dispenser and
1,280 BLU-39/B23 submunitions, each filled with CS. Upon
ejection, a pyrotechnic fuze in each submunition ignited,
disseminating the agent into the air. Delivery was
restricted to below 600 feet AGL to insure ground coverage.
Upon contact with the ground, the submunitions skittered
about, disseminating the CS even further. The CBU-30 was
compatible with both low and high speed aircraft.
In the Air Force, CS had replaced the older, less potent CN tear gas.
A MACV directive, 28 March 1970, defined CN as a "standard tear agent
employed by law enforcement agencies" and CS as "an improved agent
developed for military use." The BLU-52 consisted of CS-1, CS in a
persistent powdered form, in a 750-lb. fire bomb casing. Because CS-l
tended to cake when wet, an oil-like substance was added to improve
its flow qualities, and the improved fill was called CS-2 and the
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munition was designated BLU-52A. BLU-52s functioned as anti-personnel
area denial and interdiction munitions. They only recently were sent
to the 56 SOW in September 1970 and caused problems. The Munitions
Maintenance Squadron reported: "BLU-52's have arrived and are causing
a difficult storage situation because of lack of proper
decontaminants. These bombs will be restricted from use."
The Tilford history provided an account of the use of tear gas
which highlights its potency and shows that those who breathed the
agent could experience very strong physical reactions. It stated that
on 15 February 1969, A-1 Skyraiders flew a SAR mission near the Laos-
South Vietnam border and dropped CBU-19s. It continued:
Braving the constant hail of antiaircraft fire, the
Skyraiders made the required mile-long run at 300 feet and
220 knots to hit all their targets--enemy antiaircraft gun
positions. While the gunners choked, coughed, cried, and
retched uncontrollably, a Jolly Green [helicopter] with its
crew wearing gas masks swooped in and saved the pilot.
An Air Force historical CHECO report also included an account of the
effects of tear gas. It included a statement from a downed Air Force
pilot describing the use of riot control agents (CBU-19, CBU-30, and
BLU-52) during his rescue near Ban Phanop in Laos, lasting three-days
in December 1969:
They laid it all along the top of the ridge . . .[some
of] it hit me . . . I might as well tell you what it feels
like when that stuff goes off. I ran into a tree and was
wrapped around the tree urinating, defecating, and retching
all at the same instant. . .It also made me want to sneeze.
It was a beauty to have 500 pounders and everything go off
because it would give me a chance to sneeze. . .It goes into
effect instantaneously. Physically and mentally you can't
control yourself. . .After that every time I'd come up on the
air and ask for Vodka (A-1s carrying CBU-19), as soon as I'd
tell them where, how far and the heading, I'd tell them
'Don't get it close to me.'
The "USAF Search & Rescue Report, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec 70,~ which
covered the time of the TAILWIND Operation, contained illustrations of
the A-1 Skyraider carrying its various weapons loads, and for the SAR
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support configuration it indicated that the A-1 carried two CBU-30
weapons, and they were hung on the right and left "stubs" of the
aircraft, which placed them under the right and left wing, immediately
next to the fuselage. (See Appendix A) A set of notes dated January
1970, which a 56 SOW A-1 pilot consulted before flying missions,
provided a warning: "To dispense CBU-30 consecutively, do not set
train position. Instead, set the stub selector switches to SALVO one
at a time."
The employment of tear gas "riot control" weapons in Southeast
Asia by the Air Force and Army generated controversy, and appropriate
officials in the chain of command authorized each use of the CS air
weapon. The Seventh Air Force required regular reports on the exact
number of munitions expended during specified time periods. Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara issued a key authorization for use of CS
in Laos on 20 January 1968 when he sent a memorandum to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stating, "With reference to JCSM 480-67
of 26 August 1967, I approve at this time only so much of the JCSM
recommendation as pertains to the use of riot control agent CS in
combat aircrew recovery operations in Laos." The MACSOG history which
discussed TAILWIND noted, The authority to use CS/CN gas within the
PF [Prairie Fire] AO [area of operations] was held by the US
Ambassador to Laos. Its use was considered on a case by case basis
and was last utilized to assist in an extraction of an exploitation
force on 14 September. This date, 14 September 1970, matches last
day of the TAILWIND operation when the team was extracted and the
operation ended. A MACV directive 25 December 1971 stated that the
use of riot control agents commonly covered "extraction by helicopter
of troops, medical evacuees, and downed aircrews."
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The CBU-14 and CBU-25 weapons in the inventory of the 56 SOW
deserve special consideration because the wing was discontinuing the
use of CBU-14s and receiving CBU-25s in September 1970. Both cluster
bomb units used the suspension unit, universal (SUU)-14 dispenser,
filled with submunitions. Neither was a chemical munition. The CBU-
14 was designed for use against light materiel targets, such as
trucks. The CBU-25 was an anti-personnel weapon. The CBU-14s had a
high percentage of duds. The 56 SOW history in September 1970
reported:
Other problems included the unforeseen change in
ordnance types. When the shipment of CBU-25 arrived, the
CBU Storage Area was filled to capacity with CBU-14 leaving
no room for storage. The change was due to the
characteristics of CBU-14 which sometimes hangs undetonated
in trees, providing the enemy with a source of effective
antipersonnel munitions for use against friendly troops in
the form of booby traps. . . . Due to the late arrival of
CBU-25 ordnance (September) follow up action was not
available for this report. However, action was expected
during October to request removal of CBU-14 from NKP.
In September the A-1s of the 56 SOW expended both CBU-14 and CBU-25
munitions.
Also during September 1970, the three units of the 56 SOW which
flew the A-1 Skyraiders participated in TAILWIND, and pilots from the
wing dropped the CS weapons used during the operation. The call sign
of the A-1 pilots from the 1st Special Operations Squadron of the 56
SOW was "Hobo." Their squadron history for September stated:
The [T]ailwind exfil on 13 and 14 September was
heavily opposed, but with the help of numerous accurate low-
level attacks by A-1s, from both NKP and Danang, the ground
team was successfully extracted on the second day. Many
Hob[o] pilots were involved in this effort
The squadron history for July 1970 referred to CBU-19/CBU-30 "gas
birds," but the September history does not specifically state that the
unit's aircraft dropped gas during TAILWIND.
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The history of the 602nd Special Operations Squadron did not
mention TAILWIND, but interviews confirmed that squadron pilots flew
in support of the operation. Among the weapons the squadron used in
September were CBU-30s, CBU-14s, and CBU-25s. No CBU-19s were used
The tear gas expenditures for the month consisted of eight CBU-30 tear
gas munitions.
The 56 SOW's Operating Location AA, stationed at Da Nang,
provided a description of its TAILWIND involvement in its September
history. The A-1 pilots' call sign was "Spad":
On 11 September the Spads assisted in the infil of a
unique long range reconnaissance team. Also on that date,
units of the Royal Laotian Government were fighting to
interdict Rt 23 in the Laotian panhandle. The
reconnaissance team, code name "Tailwind," was three times
their normal size and was intent on more than
reconnaissance. Scheduled to be a diversion for the Laotian
unit, Tailwind on 12 September made contact with the enemy.
In response to this contact, the Spads launched 10 sorties
to support the tactical emergency which had developed. On
these sorties Spad pilots made numerous low altitude passes
to .50 calibre and intense small arms and automatic weapons.
Strikes were also directed against known mortar positions.
By the 13th of September the enemy had definite knowledge he
was fighting more than a standard reconnaissance team. An
aggressive effort was made to overrun the special forces.
The Spads again responded to what had now become a Prairie
Fire Emergency by providing twelve sorties. Again low
passes and precision delivery repelled hostile forces in
their attempt to destroy the friendly team. This lasted
throughout the day, and efforts were made to prepare for a
first light launch.
On the 14th of September eight sorties were launched
on this day to assist in the recovery of this team. The
team was safely extracted at 1400 hours on the 14th of
September. All total, the Spads provided thirty sorties in
support of the "Tailwind." The team reported over 400 KBA
[killed by air] and suffered only three lost during its
heroic activities.
Among the munitions the OL-AA expended during the month were CBU-25s.
In September 1970 the operating location expended no tear gas weapons.
Information in the 56 SOW history indicates that the A-l
Skyraiders which dropped tear gas during TAILWIND, expended CBU-30,
not CBU-19, tear gas munitions. Two other sources point to CBU-30 as
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the gas weapon the A-1s dropped. The computerized Southeast Asia Data
Base (SEADAB) reveals that A-1s from NKP expended 6 CBU-30s on 13
September and 6 CBU-30s on 14 September, in the area where the
TAILWIND team was located. The 12 CBU-30s used over the two-day
period include the 8 CBU-30s specifically listed in the 602 SOS
September history. Art Bishop, one of the pilots who dropped the tear
gas on the last day of the operation, 14 September, stated that he
used CBU-30, and he is certain of the type because he consulted a
diary in which he had written CBU-30. The second pilot who dropped
the gas bombs, Don Feld, clearly remembered it as tear gas, but could
not recall the type of CBU.
Other USAF tactical air (TACAIR) units and aircraft
operating in the part of Laos where the TAILWIND team operated
on 11-14 September 1970 were: F-4s and AC-130s from the 8th
Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Air Base, Thailand; F-4s from
the 388 TFW, Korat Air Base, Thailand; F-100s, probably from the
35 TFW, Phan Rang Air Base, South Vietnam; F-100s from the 355
TFW, Takhli Air Base, Thailand; AC-119s from the 18 SOS at Da
Nang Air Base; and OV-10s from the 504th Tactical Air Support
Group at NKP. Most of the unit histories did not mention
TAILWIND. One did preserve the letter of congratulations from
General Lucius Clay, Jr., Seventh Air Force commander, to the
crews of the 8 TFW, for their participation in the operation.
Clay singled out for special recognition the pilot and crew of
an AC-130 Spectre gunship, call sign Moody 2, from the 16 SOS.
SEADAB computerized data did not show any aircraft other than
the A-1s from NKP as dropping gas munitions during TAILWIND.
Among the responsibilities of the 456th Munitions Maintenance
Squadron (MMS) of the 56 SOW were those to supply the wing with all
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required munitions and associated components for combat missions and
to support all loading, downloading, arming, and disarming of all wing
aircraft requiring munitions. During an interview, the commander of
the 456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt. Col Wilfred N. Turcotte,
USAF, retired, stated that the wing had in its inventory tear gas
munitions, but no Sarin. The idea of nerve agent munitions at NRP was
a "startling concept" to him. The men in his squadron who loaded the
weapons on the aircraft did so with no protective gear and often
worked in the hot climate "stripped to the waist," wearing shorts or
long pants. As commander, he was often on the flight line as
munitions were prepared and loaded. He certainly would have known if
there was poison Sarin gas in the weapons his men handled. There was
none. He would have been notified if Sarin gas was going to be used
on a mission. He was never so informed.
During an interview, the Assistant Maintenance Supervisor of the
456 MMS at the time of TAILWIND, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF,
retired, explained that he had received formal training in identifying
and handling munitions of all types, including nerve gas. He said
there was no Sarin at NKP. Had there been he certainly would have
been aware of it, and he knew how to recognize it. He stated that had
he seen any he would have immediately reported it to the Inspector
General. At no time while he was in the 56 SOW did he see special
protective clothing, masks, rubber aprons, etc. necessary when storing
and moving nerve agent munitions. He was familiar with every storage
and work area and went through them all He checked munitions loads
daily. The gas munitions at NKP were there for search and rescue
(SAR) missions. These weapons were preloaded on trailers so they
could quickly be uploaded to the SAR aircraft.
15
[H-19]
The officer who assumed command of the 456 MMS on 23 September
1970, nine days after TAILWIND, Col. Donald L Knight, USAF, retired,
stated that the 56 SOW used tear gas on missions, but that he had
received no information at all about nerve agent munitions ever being
in the 56 SOW inventory of weapons. He never heard anything about
Sarin at NKP, and none was in the wing when he commanded the 456 MMS.
He described how weapons were preloaded on trailers in the munitions
area and driven over to the aircraft where 456 MMS members loaded them
onto the aircraft. The only protective equipment he remembered his
munitions loaders wearing on the flight line were ear plugs.
After the TAILWIND operation, General Clay, as commander of the
Seventh Air Force, attended a briefing on the mission 11-14 September,
given by one of the members of the ground element. The briefer
described in detail the combat action the group engaged in while in
Laos, and the tactical air power his team relied upon Clay wrote,
"Describing the air support as 'magnificent,' the briefer further
stated the mission could not have seen accomplished without the
coordinated, accurate air support his forces received."
Air Force units supported TAILWIND with effective and continuous
air power, but at no time during the operation did any Air Force
aircraft deliver Sarin nerve gas. The A-1 Skyraiders did expend CBU-
30 tear gas, which contributed to the successful extraction of the
TAILWIND team.
16
[H-20]
TAILWIND from the ABCCC EC-130 Perspective Matched to SEADAB Data
Two Airborne Command and Control Center (ABCCC) EC-130 aircraft
flew during TAILWIND and reported daily on the mission, starting on
its second day, September 12, when a Prairie Fire Emergency was
declared. The ABCCC messages, matched to data in the computerized
Southeast Asia Data Base, provide additional information about the
operation.
The calls signs for the two ABCCC aircraft were Moonbeam and
Hillsboro.
On 11 Sep 70 sorties by 8 TFW F-4s from Ubon dropped MK-82 bombs
at a landing zone in southern Laos at YC 4370 0470.
For the night of 12/13 Sep Moonbeam reported coverage by FLIP
(1115), an AC-119 gunship from the 18 SOS (Danang), and Moody 1 and 2
(1103 & 1119) AC-130 Spectre gunships from the 8 TFW at Ubon at
coordinates YC 4362 0498. The supporting aircraft could see mortar
rounds, grenades, and rockets falling on Company B. Firefly 44, an A-
1 out of NKP (56 SOW), expended a load of CBU-25s in support of
Tailwind that night, as did 18 Spad 01, an A-1 from 56 SOW OL-AA at
Danang. Both were guided by an Alma FAC.
The Prairie Fire Emergency continued during 13 Sep 70. ABCCC
Hillsboro reported Company B moving from landing zone to landing zone,
trying to exfiltrate the area. They were not successful, and one
Marine CH-53 (Gnat One) was destroyed but the crew was saved.
Hillsboro reported 22 A-1 sorties and 8 quick-reaction force (QRF)
sorties (F-4s) supporting Tailwind on 13 Sep These sorties included
Wolfpack 11 and 12 F-4s from 8 TFW (Ubon) dropping MK-82 bombs and
CBU-24s at YC 4480 0570; Hobo 20 and 44 A-1s from 56 SOW (NKP)
dropping CBU-25s; Spad 01 and 03 A-1s from 56 SOW OL-AA (Danang)
dropping CBU-25s and BLU-32B fire bombs.
17
[H-21]
During the 13 Sep exfiltration attempts. CBU-30 tear gas bombs
were dropped at YC 4450 0380 by Firefly 24 and Hobo 46, which were 56
SOW A-1s from NKP.
Later in the day, additional support was provided by Firefly 34
and 35 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) dropping CBU-25s at YC 4350 0450.
During the night of 13/14 Sep Moonbeam ABCCC reported that
Company B had 3 critical casualties, and 8 others wounded. Gunships
Greg 1 and 2, Will and Check, provided cover. Additional support was
provided by Hobo 30 and 31; Firefly 42 and 43; and Spad 03 and 04
Company B was extracted successfully at 1500L on 14 Sep 70.
Another Marine CH-53 was lost in this effort. Hillsboro reported that
at least 10 A-1 and 8 QRF (F-4) sorties were flown in support of
Tailwind on 14 Sep and guided by Gazor FACs. Wolfpack 11, 21, 41, and
51 F-4s (8 TFW from Ubon) dropped CBU-24s and MX 82 bombs at YC 4220
0570. Some of the A-1 sorties were Hobo 31 and 32 and Spad 01, 02, 03
and 04 (56 SOW OL-AA from Danang) dropping CBU-25s.
In support of the exfiltration on 14 Sep, CBU-30 tear gas was
dropped by Firefly 44 and Hobo 20 (56 SOW A-1s from NKP) at YC 4450
0380.
SOURCES:
1. 7AF ABCCC Msg & Narrative Rpts, 12-14 Sep 70.
2 JCS SEADAB, 11-14 Sep 70.
18
[H-22]
Sources Cited in the Unclassified Account of TAILWIND
All material cited is unclassified
U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Command History 1970
Annex B, Studies and Observations Group, 8 April 1971, Air Force
History Support Office (AFHSO), Bolling AFB, DC.
History, 56th Special Operations Wing, July - September 1970,
vols 1 and 2, microfilm, AFHSO.
These volumes contain the monthly histories of 1st Special
Operations Squadron (SOS), 21 SOS, 602 SOS, Operating Location AA, and
456th Munitions Maintenance Squadron.
Earl H. Tilford, Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975
(Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1980).
History, 56th Special Operations Wing, April - June 1969, vol 1,
microfilm, AFHSO.
Project CORONA HARVEST Report, HQ PACAF (DOV), In-Country and
Out-Country Strike Operations in Southeast Asia, 1 Jan 65 - 31 Dec 69,
vol 2, Hardware: Munitions. 2 Nov 1970. AFHSO.
Report, USAF Search & Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1 Jul 69-31 Dec
70," microfilm, AFHSO.
MACV Directive 525-11, 28 March 1970, "Employment of Riot Control
Agents an Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Attack,~
copy from National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), AFHSO
Lt Col John Schlight, Project CHECO SEA Report, "Rescue at Ban
Phanop, 5-7 Dec 1969," 7 AF/DOAC, 15 February 1970. AFHSO.
Photocopies of 456th Munitions Maintenance cards, faxed from Col
Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, to Diane T. Putney, AFHSO. 26 June
1998. AFHSO.
Memo, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Subject: "Use of
Riot Control Agent (CS) in Combat Aircrew Recovery Operations in Laos
and NVN," 20 January 1968, copy from NARA in AFHSO.
MACV Directive 525-11, 25 December 1971, "Employment of Riot
Control Agents and Defense Against Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear
Attack," copy from NARA, AFHSO.
Interview, Art Bishop (Major Arthur N. Bishop, USAF, in 1970), by
Wayne Thompson, AFHSO, 16 June 1998.
Interview, Don Feld (2Lt Donald H. Feld, USAF, in 1970), by Wayne
Thompson, AFHSO, 17 June 1998.
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) in
Center for Electronic Records, NARA.
Letter, Lucius D. Clay, Jr., 7AF/CC, to Colonel Larry M.
19
[H-23]
Killpack, 8TFW/CC, 8 October 1970, in History (S), "8th Tactical
Fighter Wing," vol 2, microfilm, AFHSO.
Interviews, Lt Col Wilfred N. Turcotte, USAF, retired, by Diane
T. Putney, AFHSO, 26 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July
1998.
Interviews, Lt Col Paul C. Spencer, USAF, retired, by Yvonne A.
Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3 July 1998, and Sheldon A. Goldberg, AFHSO, 3 July
1998.
Interviews, Col Donald L. Knight, USAF, retired, by Diane T.
Putney, AFHSO, 26 and 29 June 1998, and Yvonne A. Kinkaid, AFHSO, 3
July 1998.
Messages and Narrative Reports, 7AF Airborne Command and Control
Center (ABCCC), 12-14 September 1970, microfilm, AFHSO.
John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in
Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997).
Manuscript, Bernard C. Nalty, Interdiction in Southern Laos,
1968-1972. AFHSO.
20
[H-24]
B. Related Topics
1. Considerations: Nerve Agent Weapons
The following describes an exercise with MC-1, a Sarin nerve
agent munition, which shows the precautions necessary when handling
lethal nerve gas. In January 1969, the 313th Air Division informed the
400th Munitions Maintenance Squadron (MMS) and other interested USAF
units on Okinawa of a USAF operational test and evaluation program for
the 750 lb. MC-1 Sarin nerve gas bomb to be conducted at Dugway
Proving Grounds, Utah, in March 1969.
Leakproof containers were shipped in from Ogden Air Materiel Area
(OOAMA), and Disaster Control Forces at Kadena were extensively
trained. Army and Air Force Technical Escort teams inspected the 25
weapons carefully and supervised the loading into the containers which
were then mounted on 9 pallets.
On 27 March 1969, the convoy of bombs left the Chibana Army
Ammunition Depot in tractor trailers for an hour and a half drive to
Kadena. They were escorted by Security Police, Disaster Control, and
medical teams. Loading into the C-141 took an hour.
The C-141 flew to Dugway via Barber's Point, Hawaii. The
Technical Escort team and the aircrew had masks and Atropine. The
team worked in shifts to monitor the cargo by checking the pallet tie
downs and the containers. There was no way to check for leaks within
the containers. Since the gas was tasteless, odorless, and invisible,
the method used to detect leaks indoors was to place several rabbits
in cages around the area and see if they were affected. This
procedure was done on the flight. The rabbits survived. The trip was
uneventful.
SOURCES: Trip Report, DTC 69-14, Tech Escort Support, 27-28 Mar 69,
1Lt P.C. Spencer, 313 AD/DMW, 30 Apr 69, in History 400 MMS, Jan-JUn
1969, and Interview with Lt Col P. C. Spencer, USAF, Ret., 3 Jul 1998.
21
[H-25]
2. Clay/Killpack Letter (7 AF/CC Letter to 8 TFW/CC)
At some point after 7 June 1998, CNN provided a copy of an Air
Force letter from the Seventh Air Force (7 AF) Commander to the 8th
Tactical Fighter Wing (8 TFW) Commander, congratulating the latter on
his wing's performance in Operation TAILWIND. The letter had a one-
page attachment with excerpts from a TAILWIND after-action report. At
issue is an unreadable digit in the last paragraph of the excerpts
page, referring to a cluster bomb unit (CBU) weapon, possibly CBU-15
or CBU-25.
The historians found a copy of the 7 AF letter in the history of
the 8 TFW, July-September 1970. It did not include the attachment.
They also found correspondence forwarding the 7 AF letter to the Wing
Director of Operations and the 16th Special Operations Squadron (16
SOS) because the 7 AF letter singled out one AC-130 crew for special
praise.
On 30 June 1998, the historians received a copy of the TAILWIND
after-action report delivered to General Abrams by Lt Van Buskirk in
1970. From the fax markings, the report seems to have come from the
McCarley family. Most of the quoted items in the excerpts page match
the Van Buskirk report. The use of CBU-25s is mentioned three times
in the Van Buskirk account. Van Buskirk's report identified the gas
munition used on 14 September 1970 as CBU-19 tear gas Actually, the
historians have determined that it was CBU-30 tear gas.
The historians were not able to find coverage of TAILWIND or the
7 AF Commander's letter in the history of 7 AF, July-December 1970
They could not find any similar congratulatory letters to any of the
other 7 AF Wings participating in TAILWIND.
22
[H-26]
Attached to the copy of the 7 AF Commander's letter provided by
CNN was a Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) listing for a
September 1967 Air Proving Ground Command Report of an engineering
evaluation of the CBU-15/A.
The report covers test of the CBU-15/A with F-100, F-105, and F-
4C aircraft from August 1964 through July 1967. The Phase I bomb
operated properly, but did not provide enough area coverage to meet
the operational requirement. It was also estimated that a larger
Phase II bomb would not meet the operational requirement
It was recommended that if six SUU-13/A dispensers were fitted to
an F-4D, it might produce an area coverage to meet the operational
requirement.
The report shows that this munition was being tested on fast-
moving jet aircraft. There is no indication of compatibility testing
with "slow moving" A-1 Skyraider aircraft.
23
[H-27]
3. Explanation of Research in SEADAB and CACTA
The Southeast Asia Data Base (SEADAB) is in the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). It describes fixed-wing
combat air missions of the U.S. military services, from 1970 to 1975,
and includes such data as mission dates, aircraft flown, weapons
loads, and bomb damage assessments. In 1977 the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS) gave the SEADAB computer tapes and SEADAB computer coding
instructions dated 1975 to NARA.
Early in 1993, an AF Reserve IMA officer assigned to the Air
Force History Support Office (AFHSO) began work on decoding the SEADAB
tapes in NARA. The Office of the Air Force Historian (HQ USAF/HO)
provided funding to a contractor which employed some personnel who
worked with SEADAB in the early 1970s. Additional funding was
provided in 1996 by Special Operations Command, Pacific (SOCPAC),
which needed the data for de-mining projects in SEA, in the effort to
locate and detonate unexploded ordnance dropped during the conflict in
SEA. A full and accurate decoding of the more than 170 data fields
for all of 1970-1975 requires significant additional research.
WhiLe doing their TAILWIND research, Air Force historians
requested that the Reserve officer generate a computer print-out from
SEADAB showing any CBU-15 munitions dropped by A-1 aircraft,
1970-1972. The print-out showed that the A-1s dropped "CBU-15
AntiMaterial" weapons more than 2,000 times. The historians knew an
error occurred because the CBU-15 is not an anti-materiel munition and
the weight of the weapon was incorrect. They doubted that the CBU-15
nerve agent bomb could have been used secretly over 2,000 times. They
asked the USAF Reserve officer who had generated the print-out to see
if the coding instructions could explain how the error occurred.
24
[H-28]
The officer consulted a second set of SEADAB computer card
coding instructions which he had acquired from the Pacific Air Forces
(PACAF) history office. Both the PACAF coding instructions and the
1975 JCS coding instructions referred to the same SEADAB data base,
but the instructions were printed at different times.
The PACAF coding instructions are in a binder titled "Old
SEADAB Tables" and consist of two sets of print-outs showing the
current status of the computer card coding instructions from August
1970 to November 1974. One set with data printed in a narrow, compact
format identifies Code 415 in the munitions table (Table 8) as CBU-14
Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from 1970 to 1974. The other set, with a
spread out full text format, shows Code 415 in Table 8 as CBU-14
Anti-Material, 250 lbs. from August 1970 to September 1972 The 30
October 1972 edition shows Code 41S as CBU-15, but still describes it
as Anti-Material, 250 lbs. This change continues through 1974.
The bottom line was that in 1970, there was no code for CBU-15.
Code 415 meant CBU-14 in the card coding instructions for 1970. When
the tape was run for 1970 using the 1970 card coding instructions, it
showed CBU-14, 24, and 25 as anti-material and anti-personnel bomblets
and CBU-30 tear gas.
As a double check to the SEADAB data base, the historians
studied a second computerized data base in NARA, the Combat Air
Activities (CACTA) file. CACTA contains data from combat air missions
in Southeast Asia, October 1965-December 1970. It was the official
record for 1970 while SEADAB was still being tested. SEADAB became the
official record for operational aircraft sorties on 1 January 1971
NARA provided the historians with a CACTA computer data tape
which contained information on all missions flown in September 1970.
25
[H-29]
The historians sent the tape to the contractors who had been working
on SEADAB for the de-mining project. The contractors worked over the
4th of July weekend 1998 to extract data from the CACTA tape They
succeeded in producing a print-out of missions flown during the time
of TAILWIND, 11-14 September 1970.
The CACTA data on all missions flown during the TAILWIND
Operation showed no CBU-15 sarin gas munitions expended. No nerve
agent weapons of any type showed up in the CACTA data.
The SEADAB data had shown 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 13
September 1970 and 4 sorties carrying CBU-30 on 14 September.
Although the CACTA computer print-out was incomplete, it did show a
"Hobo" mission, number 623, carrying CBU-30 to target coordinates
YC44500380 on 14 September. One of the sorties shown in SEADAB for 14
September and expending CBU-30 also had the call sign "Hobo," mission
number 623, and target coordinates YC44500380. CACTA confirmed data
in SEADAB that CBU-30 was expended on 14 September by an aircraft with
the call sign "Hobo." "Hobo" was the call sign of the 1st Special
Operations Squadron of the 56th Special Operations Wing, which flew the
A-1 Skyraider missions on 14 September for Operation TAILWIND.
See Appendices G and I.
[Note: No appendices were provided]
26
[End Tab H]